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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 12-3893 & 12-4419 
____________ 
  
A. P., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH RASHEENA PHINISEE,  
PARENT AND NATURAL GUARDIAN;  
RASHEENA PHINISEE, IN HER OWN RIGHT,                                                                                                                                                 
Appellants 
  
v. 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
___________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-10-cv-01253) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Jacob P. Hart
*
 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2014 
____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 21, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
 
 
                                              
*
 All parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by Magistrate Judge Hart pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Rasheena Phinisee, on her own and on behalf of her minor daughter A. P. 
(together, the “plaintiffs”), appeal the Magistrate Judge‟s orders granting the 
Government‟s motion to enforce settlement and approving a petition to compromise 
minor‟s action and allocate settlement funds, as well as the Magistrate Judge‟s orders 
denying reconsideration of those orders.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the essential facts.  The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) on March 22, 2010.  The 
plaintiffs allege that A. P. developed biliary atresia, a disorder that causes liver failure, as 
a result of A. P.‟s ingestion through breast milk of Macrobid, a medication prescribed for 
Phinisee at a federally-funded health care clinic on May 15, 2008.  With the parties‟ 
consent, the case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jacob P. Hart (the 
“Magistrate Judge”) and scheduled for an April 30, 2012 bench trial.  On April 11, 2012, 
the Magistrate Judge granted the Government‟s motion to bifurcate the trial as to liability 
and damages.  The Government also moved for summary judgment, on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs could not establish the causal element of their negligence claim. 
 While the Government‟s summary judgment motion was pending, on April 19, 
2012, the parties
1
 attended a settlement conference conducted by Magistrate Judge 
                                              
1
 Phinisee attended the conference with her attorneys Derek Layser and Gilbert Spencer.  
The Government was represented by Assistant United States Attorneys. 
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Thomas J. Rueter.  After almost a day of negotiations, Magistrate Judge Rueter informed 
the plaintiffs‟ counsel that the Government had offered to settle the case for $1.2 million.  
With Phinisee‟s authorization, her counsel accepted the offer.  All parties were aware that 
the settlement was subject to final approval by the Assistant Attorney General for the 
Civil Division.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2677; 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.160(a)(2), 0.168. 
The day after the conference, Phinisee informed Spencer by telephone that she had 
decided to retract her acceptance because she had discovered that the settlement 
proceeds, which were to be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of A. P., were 
subject to a lien held by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”) for 
past medical expenses paid through Medicaid in the gross amount of $703,491.25.  
Appendix (“App.”) 480, 488.2  Phinisee reiterated her opposition to the settlement in 
follow-up emails to Spencer on April 23, 24, and 25, 2012.  On April 26, 2012, one week 
after the settlement conference, the Government emailed the written settlement 
agreement to Layser and Spencer.  Also on April 26, Phinisee faxed to Judge Rueter a pro 
se “Motion to Reopen Civil Action.”  Phinisee discharged her counsel the next day.   
On May 15, 2012, the Government filed a motion to enforce settlement.  The court 
held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to enforce on June 6, 2012.
3
  Phinisee, who 
was represented by new counsel, testified that she had never been informed of the DPW 
                                              
2
 DPW administers Medicaid in Pennsylvania and is accordingly authorized to recover 
the reasonable value of benefits provided under the program from liable third parties.  
E.D.B. ex rel. D.B. v. Clair, 987 A.2d 681, 684 (Pa. 2009) (citing 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 201, 1409(b)(1)). 
3
 In advance of the hearing, the Government filed a Notice that the Acting Assistant 
General for the Civil Division had approved the settlement.  App. 255-56. 
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Medicaid lien and, upon learning of its existence, no longer believed that the 
Government‟s offer adequately protected A. P.  The plaintiffs additionally argued that the 
April 19 conference could not have resulted in a binding settlement because the 
Government‟s offer was contingent upon its ability to obtain approval from the Assistant 
Attorney General, and because her counsel had misled her into dropping claims brought 
in her own name.  Layser and Spencer — each of whom possesses decades of experience 
in the field of medical malpractice — testified that liens are involved in “virtually every” 
case, and that they “definitely” discussed the Medicaid lien with Phinisee on the day of 
the conference.  App. 285, 294, 328-29, 335, 338.  Layser and Spencer further testified 
that Phinisee was “happy” to “get it done,” and, after discussing the pros and cons of the 
$1.2 million offer, she “enthusiastically” authorized them to accept it.  App. 294, 335-36.   
The Magistrate Judge granted the Government‟s motion to enforce settlement on 
August 6, 2012.  The plaintiffs‟ former counsel filed a petition for minor‟s compromise4 
on August 8, 2012.  The plaintiffs did not respond to the petition, and the Magistrate 
Judge approved it on September 4, 2012.  The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of 
both rulings.  The Magistrate Judge denied the plaintiffs‟ motions for reconsideration. 
The plaintiffs timely appealed the Magistrate Judge‟s orders:  (1) granting the 
Government‟s motion to enforce settlement; (2) denying reconsideration of its 
enforcement ruling; (3) approving the petition for minor‟s compromise and distributing 
settlement proceeds; and (4) denying reconsideration of the distribution order. 
II. 
                                              
4
 See Local Rule 41.2 (E.D. Pa. rev. Dec. 2013). 
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The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Ordinarily, we review the denial of a motion for 
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 
52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, “[b]ecause an appeal from a denial of a 
[m]otion for [r]econsideration brings up the underlying judgment for review, the standard 
of review varies with the nature of the underlying judgment.”  McAlister v. Sentry Ins. 
Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992).  Where the underlying judgment was “based in 
part upon the interpretation and application of a legal precept,” our review is plenary.  
United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1992).  To the extent that the 
Magistrate Judge‟s order was based on its factual conclusions, we review under a “clearly 
erroneous” standard.  Id.; see also Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1031 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
III. 
 The plaintiffs first argue that “no evidence” supports the Magistrate Judge‟s 
finding that an oral settlement agreement was reached on April 19, 2012.  Pls.‟ Br. 9-12.  
We apply Pennsylvania law to the enforceability of the parties‟ settlement agreement.  
See Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 & n.6.  The enforceability of settlement agreements is 
determined by general principles of contract law.  Storms ex rel. Storms v. O‟Malley, 779 
A.2d 548, 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).  “As with any contract, it is essential . . . that the 
minds of the parties should meet upon all the terms, as well as the subject-matter, of the 
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[settlement agreement].”  Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999) (quotation 
marks omitted).   
 The record in this case is replete with evidence, which the Magistrate Judge 
credited, that:  the Assistant United States Attorneys offered to settle the case for $1.2 
million;
5
 Judge Rueter conveyed that offer to the plaintiffs‟ then-counsel; Phinisee 
instructed her counsel to accept the offer; and counsel did so.  See App. 9 (citing App. 
370, 382).  The Magistrate Judge also found — and the plaintiffs do not challenge on 
appeal — that the plaintiffs‟ counsel informed Phinisee about the existence and 
significance of the Medicaid lien on the settlement proceeds.  Because there was a 
meeting of the minds upon all the terms and subject matter of the settlement, the 
Magistrate Judge correctly held that a contract was formed on the day of the settlement 
conference.  Cf. Taylor v. Stanley Co. of Am., 158 A. 157, 159 (Pa. 1932). 
 The plaintiffs next argue that, even if there were a settlement agreement, it was 
tentative because it was conditioned upon the approval of the Assistant Attorney General, 
and “[a] conditional offer has no legal or binding effect.”  Pls.‟ Br. 12.  The enforceability 
of the parties‟ settlement agreement may be “obfuscated to some extent” by the 
                                              
5
 The plaintiffs contend that the Government‟s offer was invalid because the Assistant 
United States Attorneys lacked “actual authority” to bind the Government.  See Pls.‟ Br. 
9-12.  The “actual authority” requirement is an additional prerequisite for the effective 
formation of federal government contracts — not settlement agreements to which the 
Government happens to be a party.  See, e.g., Hanlin v. United States, 316 F.3d 1325, 
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  As previously discussed, state law governs the effect of a 
purported release from liability under the FTCA.  Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 & n.6; see 
also Reo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 77 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he rules governing 
settlement of minor‟s claims are embedded in the traditional state-law domain of 
contract, agency, and family law.”).  Therefore, the plaintiffs‟ reference to federal 
government contracts law is inapt. 
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ratification requirement.  Ostman v. St. John‟s Episcopal Hosp., 918 F. Supp. 635, 644 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519, 2677; 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.160(a)(2), 0.168(d).  
Contrary to the plaintiffs‟ position, however, a valid bilateral contract may arise “even 
though the promise of one party to perform is qualified by a condition other than the 
performance of the other party,” provided that “the condition [does] not make the 
promise illusory or enable the promis[o]r to avoid performance at will.”  Main Line 
Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 298 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1962); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 76, 224.  “An implied obligation to use good 
faith is enough to avoid the finding of an illusory promise.”  In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 
264 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). 
 By agreeing to the settlement of the plaintiffs‟ action, the parties also implicitly 
agreed that both the plaintiffs‟ and the Government‟s interests would be served by 
awarding the plaintiffs $1.2 million in exchange for the plaintiffs releasing the 
Government from liability under the FTCA.  That the Government did, in fact, exercise 
good faith is illustrated by the Assistant Attorney General‟s approval of the settlement 
one month later.  Because the condition of approval did not render the Government‟s 
offer of settlement illusory, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that the April 19, 2012 
settlement agreement was enforceable.  See Ostman, 918 F. Supp. at 644 (an enforceable 
contract was reached during the settlement conference despite the need for ratification, 
which the court construed as “an implied condition precedent to the maturation of the 
remaining duties under the settlement agreement”). 
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 “[T]he federal government, though not independent of the court‟s authority, is also 
not like any other litigant.”  United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Mariana Islands, 694 
F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2012).  Indeed, it would be “highly impractical, if not 
physically impossible,” for the Assistant Attorney General to prepare for and appear at all 
settlement conferences for all cases that he possesses the authority to settle.  Id.; see also 
In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1993) (district court abused its discretion by 
routinely requiring a Government representative with “ultimate settlement authority” to 
be present at all pretrial or settlement conferences). 
 “Settlement[s] of matters in dispute are favored by the law and must, in the 
absence of fraud and mistake, be sustained.  Otherwise any settlement agreement will 
serve no useful purpose.”  Greentree Cinemas, Inc. v. Hakim, 432 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981).  There being no evidence of either fraud or mistake, we hold that the 
Magistrate Judge did not erroneously grant the Government‟s motion to enforce.6 
IV. 
                                              
6
 Because the parties entered a binding contract on April 19, 2012, we need not address 
the plaintiffs‟ argument that the Assistant Attorney General‟s ratification was “a nullity” 
due to the plaintiffs‟ having “retracted” their acceptance in the days following the 
settlement conference.  Pls.‟ Br. 12-13.  The plaintiffs‟ final argument — that the 
Magistrate Judge “has not ruled on” Phinisee‟s individual, “parental claim” for damages, 
Pls.‟ Br. 14-15 — also fails.  Even assuming that such a claim is cognizable, it was 
extinguished by the settlement agreement.  See App. 321, 323, 349-50. 
 The plaintiffs also appeal the Magistrate Judge‟s order denying their motion for 
reconsideration.  We will affirm the order because, as the Magistrate Judge concluded, 
their reconsideration motion merely “attempt[ed] to convince the court to rethink its 
decision,” App. 22, and we have concluded that the Magistrate Judge‟s decision was 
correct. 
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 The plaintiffs also challenge the Magistrate Judge‟s grant of the petition for 
minor‟s compromise.  The plaintiffs specifically argue that the court‟s approval of the 
petition denied them procedural due process because it was filed by attorneys whom they 
had previously discharged.  The plaintiffs also argue that the petition was legally 
“deficient.”  Pls.‟ Br. 9.  Rule 41.2(a) of the Local Rules of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania provides that, “[n]o claim of a minor . . . 
shall be compromised, settled, or dismissed unless approved by the court.”  Rule 41.2(b) 
and (c) further prohibit the distribution of proceeds, counsel fees, costs, or expenses out 
of any fund obtained for a minor without court approval.  To assure that the child‟s 
interests are protected, a petition for minor‟s compromise “should include all relevant 
facts and the reasons why the guardian of the minor believes that a settlement is desirable 
and in the minor‟s best interest to discontinue, compromise, or settle the action.”  Klein v. 
Cissone, 443 A.2d 799, 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see also Reo, 98 F.3d at 76 (courts 
“uniformly” look to state law to determine the validity of settlements entered between the 
Government and an FTCA claimant).  The court, by contrast, “must concern itself with 
the concrete issues of „causation‟ and „proof.‟”  Klein, 443 A.2d at 803. 
 We summarily reject the plaintiffs‟ argument that they were deprived of due 
process.  As the Magistrate Judge observed, although the petition was filed by the 
plaintiffs‟ former counsel, the filing was appropriate because the same attorneys had 
obtained the settlement.  App. 28.  Moreover, the petition was filed on August 8, 2012 
and served upon new counsel.  Thus, to the extent that a court‟s approval of minor‟s 
compromise could constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the plaintiffs in 
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this case were given ample notice of the petition and an opportunity to be heard.  The 
plaintiffs neither responded to the petition nor requested an extension of time for filing a 
response, but rather moved for reconsideration two weeks after the petition was 
approved.  App. 27.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] client ratifies [her] attorney‟s act if 
[s]he does not repudiate it promptly upon receiving knowledge that the attorney has 
exceeded his authority.”  Yarnall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 87 A.2d 192, 193 (Pa. 
1952) (emphasis added). 
 We also reject the plaintiffs‟ contention that the petition was substantively 
inadequate.  While not expansive, the petition set forth reasons why settlement was 
appropriate, such as the complexity of the medical issues involved and “numerous 
causation defenses” raised by the Government.  App. 480.  At the evidentiary hearing on 
the motion to enforce, the Magistrate Judge similarly opined that, if the case were to 
proceed to the scheduled bench trial, it would not be a “slam dunk” for the plaintiffs in 
light of the “mountains of dueling experts,” “not the least of which are dueling experts on 
whether the medicine that the child was given was the reason for the liver failure.”  App. 
279-80.  The Magistrate Judge emphasized these concerns in denying the plaintiffs‟ 
motion for reconsideration — observing that, in light of the Government‟s medical expert 
testimony, the plaintiffs “ran a very meaningful risk of obtaining no recovery at all.”  
App. 27-28.  As the ultimate fact finder, the Magistrate Judge was in the best position to 
assess whether the settlement protected A. P.‟s best interests.  The Magistrate Judge 
found that it did.  We cannot conclude that this finding was erroneous. 
V. 
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  For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge‟s orders will be affirmed. 
